Tag Archives: technology and growth

Hiding from the Computers Part 1: The 47%

A rather dismal chart to kick off the New Year (click for larger image):

Probability of Computerisation jpeg

It’s taken from a paper by Frey and Osborne of Oxford University entitled “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?”.

Let’s break this chart down. The total area under the curve is equivalent to aggregate US employment. The bottom x axis is the probability that any given job will be computerised: it ranges from zero, no chance of computerisation, to 1, a 100% chance of computerisation. Further, the authors have lumped these probabilities into three broad categories: 1) low probability, zero to 30% change of computerisation, 2) medium, 30% to 70% chance and 3) high, 70% to 100% chance.

So if you are doing a job in the high probability category, there is a high risk that your job will disappear over the course of time. How many people are in this category. Kindly they give the rather shocking number: 47%. Conversely, around 33% of the working population sit in the low probability category and can sleep easily at night for a little while longer.

Now the eagle-eyed will have noticed that there are no dates given in the chart over which the rise of the computers will take place. This is because the authors have looked at the problem as engineers, disassembling jobs into their component parts to decide which bits can be replaced by computers and which can’t. They don’t try to predict when the technology will reach the necessary maturity. In their words:

According to our estimate, 47 percent of total US employment is in the high risk category, meaning that associated occupations are potentially automatable over some unspecified number of years, perhaps a decade or two. It should be note that the probability axis can be seen as a rough timeline, where high probability occupations are likely to be submitted by computer capital relatively soon.

So, accordingly to their guestimate, computers will munch through the job market—moving from right to left in the chart—arriving in the medium probability category some time around 2030.You can also see where you don’t want to be; for example, the yellow band ‘production’ stinks along with orange ‘office and administration support’.

To arrive at this chart, the authors looked at 702 occupations and analysed them with respect to how susceptible each one was to computerisation. Computerisation here is taken in the broad sense to include machine learning, artificial intelligence and mobile robotics. To do so, they identified cognitive and non-cognitive bottle necks to computerisation and used these as variable to predict the order and extent of future computerisation. The bottleneck variables are given below:

O Net Variable Jan 14 jpeg

Further, a bottleneck such as manual dexterity could be classed as low, such as fitting a light bulb, to high, as for example performing open heart surgery.

Overall, the paper’s analysis suggests that the job market, as we know it, will be blown up over the next two decades, along with all our economic assumptions. Yet I hear not one politician talking about this risk. I will return to this subject in my next post.

Are Our Problems Purely Short Term (Or Bernanke’s Contradiction)?

Last weekend, I posted a link to a speech given by Fed Governor Ben Bernanke entitled  “Economic Prospect for the Long Term”. The speech is interesting because Bernanke rarely touches on the topic of long-term growth, but on this occasion he addressed the fears of many young graduates (at least those graduates of a reflective disposition) that they face a difficult future:

Now here’s a question–in fact, a key question, I imagine, from your perspective. What does the future hold for the working lives of today’s graduates? The economic implications of the first two waves of innovation, from the steam engine to the Boeing 747, were enormous…..

…… some knowledgeable observers have recently made the case that the IT revolution, as important as it surely is, likely will not generate the transformative economic effects that flowed from the earlier technological revolutions. As a result, these observers argue, economic growth and change in coming decades likely will be noticeably slower than the pace to which Americans have become accustomed. Such an outcome would have important social and political–as well as economic–consequences for our country and the world.

To counter this rational pessimism (which this blog espouses), Bernanke gave three main counter arguments.

  1. We can’t predict the technological future
  2. The IT revolution has barely started and its best fruit, in terms of economic growth, may yet to be harvested
  3. Globalisation allows the generation, transmission and adaption of new ideas to take place on an unprecedented scale

The only problem with this rose-tinted spectacle view of the world is that it flies in the face of the market’s own evidence. In a speech just two months earlier, Bernanke tackled the question of why interest rates were so low. The collapse of nominal interest rates is visible everywhere, as one of the charts accompanying his speech shows (click for larger image):

10-Year Government Bond Yield jpeg

Bernanke then described a nominal interest rate as being composed of three components: a) expected inflation, b) expected short-term real interest rates and c) the term premium (risk associated with a longer maturity bond). A chart from his speech disaggregating the U.S. nominal rate into these three components can be seen here (click for larger image):

Decomposition of 10 Year Treasury jpeg

Note that the expected average short-term real interest rate has come down from around 2% in the year 2000 to essentially zero now. And what does this mean in economic terms. Bernanke provides the answer:

In the longer term, real interest rates are determined primarily by nonmonetary factors, such as the expected return to capital investments, which in turn is closely related to the underlying strength of the economy. The fact that market yields currently incorporate an expectation of very low short-term real interest rates over the next 10 years suggests that market participants anticipate persistently slow growth and, consequently, low real returns to investment. In other words, the low level of expected real short rates may reflect not only investor expectations for a slow cyclical recovery but also some downgrading of longer-term growth prospects.

The disjoint between the two speeches is obvious. In the first, Bernanke’s message—when talking to a class of fresh-faced new graduates—is a relatively upbeat one: don’t give up on growth. In the second, a speech given at a macroeconomic conference, Bernanke suggests that the market is signalling that we have a growth problem.

This also has huge implications for fiscal and monetary policy. If growth has slowed in recent years due to underlying technological factors and not just due to the credit crisis, then it will be exceedingly difficult to kick start the economy through unconventional monetary policy and aggressive fiscal injections. The policy of quantitative easing, which monetary authorities are pursuing in most advanced countries, is premised on the idea that there exists a gap between what the economy could be producing and what it is actually producing (the so called output gap). Should that gap prove a mirage then current policies will be ineffectual.