Tag Archives: BNEF

Seba’s Solar Revolution Part 3 (Where to Put the Panels)

In my last post, I mentioned that the late Cambridge University professor David Mackay was skeptical over the ability of solar to play a lead role in decarbonising the world’s energy infrastructure. MacKay’s highly influential book “Sustainable Energy Without the Hot Air” is rooted in basic science. Yet, despite the text being peppered with scientific identities, it also includes a number of value judgements that touch on the world of economics. And it is from these value judgements that MacKay’s skepticism arises.

MacKay’s book is principally concerned with what it would take to decarbonise the UK economy. Tony Seba, in contrast, forecasts that solar can power the globe not just the UK. In this post, I will stay with the UK, although I will look at other countries in future posts. Nonetheless, for Tony to be right, each and every country must be able to secure its energy needs through solar including the UK (though the solar energy may be imported from abroad). Accordingly, if Mackay’s argument is right (that is that the UK’s solar resource in inadequate) then Tony’s is wrong (notwithstanding the import argument).

Two of the major pushbacks against solar rest on the land mass requirement for sufficient energy generation and the intermittent nature of solar that puts unbearable stresses on the grid. As a former economist by training, I regard such arguments as second-order ones. They are both really subsumed under cost issues. Land is just a scarce resource like any other, and if the return on the land used for solar is higher than that for any other use, then it should be allocated to solar-power usage (that calculation can take into account the cost of climate change and the public good value of land).

Moreover, the unit of energy we are working with in this post, a kilowatt hour, is quite simplistic in economic terms. Energy is demanded at a particular place and at a particular time (hour of the day, and day of the year). A kilowatt hour generated in mid-summer in Spain in July, it not the same thing as a kilowatt hour consumed in mid-winter in London in January. The levelised cost approach (I will have a lot to say on that in future), which is used to compare different energy-producing assets, doesn’t take time and place into account.

In reality, we can think of the energy market as composed of 8,760 hour-long blocks (24 hours times 365 days) with a GPS attached to each one. In each of these GPS-stamped timed blocks, the market will equalise supply and demand at a certain price.

MacKay’s analysis only implicitly addresses the economics. Nonetheless, before we start moving energy through time and space, we must ensure that we have enough energy to move in the first place. MacKay does tackle that question.

In a section of his book titled “Fantasy time: solar farming”, Mackay conducts a thought experiment within which he covers 5% of the UK land with 10%-efficient solar photovoltaic panels.

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He starts by calculating that “the average raw power of sunshine per square metre of flat ground (in the UK) is roughly 100 W/m2″. However, with a 10% efficiency photovoltaic panel, of the 100 W/m2 only 10 W/m2 is converted into electricity. From my last post we also know that if we leave a 40W light bulb on all day, it will use up nearly 1 kWh of power (0.04kW times 24). So if we generate 10 W per a one metre squared solar panel, we will get a quarter of that in energy, or 0.25 kWh. MacKay in his calculation has allocated 5% of the UK’s land mass to be used for solar power, which gives 200 m2 to each UK citizen. Times 200 by 0.25 kWh and we get 50 kWh per person per day, which compares with total energy demand of 125 kWh per person per day.

Also, as an aside, note that his calculation goes from power (solar irradiance measured in watts or kilowatts) into an energy number (solar insolation measured in watt hours or kilowatt hours).

At this point, let’s take a step back and look at that allocation of 5% of the UK’s land mass to solar panels. The UK land area is 25.25 million hectares and the population 66 million. Divide one by the other and we get around 0.38 hectares per person, (or just under an acre), which is the same thing as 3,800 m2. MacKay gives each person in the UK 4,000 m2 of land each since the population of the UK was about 5 million smaller when he was working out the maths. However, these numbers are near enough.

Switching from metres squared per person to number of persons per square kilometre, which is the standard measure when comparing countries, I have put together a table of population densities for selected countries, mostly ones with large populations, below. Note that a hectare (10,000 m) is 0.01 of a square kilometre, so 0.4 hectares (40,000 mor 0.004 square kilometres) per person translates into 250 people per square kilometre.

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From the table we can see that only the Netherlands, Japan, the Philippines, India and Bangladesh have population densities higher than the UK. So if the UK can become energy self-sufficient via solar it bodes very well for the rest of the world (putting differing solar irradiance numbers for each country aside for the time being). Moreover, the really profligate energy users, like the USA and Australia (which get through over twice the energy per person than the UK), have the advantage of having a lot of land.

Back to the UK and MacKay’s fantasy time solar farming:

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That 50 kWh per day per person amounts to 40% of the UK’s energy consumption of 125 kWh per person per day. Accordingly, if we hold our 10% panel efficiency steady, then to meet 100% of UK energy requirements we would need to cover 12.5% of the UK land mass with solar panels (about 500 m2 per person).

Critically, MacKay headed his calculation “fantasy time” since he felt the calculation rested upon an unrealistically high cost. Fortunately, this is one area where MacKay was wrong (and Seba right): those fantasy cost reductions have come true (from Bloomberg‘s New Energy Finance (BNEF)‘s New Energy Outlook 2018):

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In short, MacKay was far too pessimistic when it came to the cost curve. BNEF calculates a learning rate of 28.5% for solar PV. The learning rate 28.5% means that every time production capacity for solar PV panels is doubled, the cost of those panels comes down by 28.5%. This is an example of a virtuous circle: lower costs spur greater demand for the panels, which spurs greater production, which spurs future cost cuts and thus greater demand — and so the cycle goes on. (Of course, the panels are not the only components that go into a utility sized solar farm and all the other components will have their own learning curves and, hopefully, declining cost curves. We will come back to that in a later post.)

We are 10 years on from when MacKay wrote Without the Hot Air and already solar is overtaking all existing sources of fossil-fueled energy production in terms of cost competitiveness. Of course, there is a big caveat here: production costs are very different from the cost to deliver energy to a customer at a particular time and at a particular place as I have flagged above. Nonetheless, MacKay was worried about how solar stacked up cost-wise on a production basis out to 2050. That worry was misplaced.

How audacious is this plan? The solar power capacity required to deliver this 50 kWh per day per person in the UK is more than 100 times all the photovoltaics in the whole world. So should I include the PV farm in my sustainable production stack? I’m in two minds. At the start of this book I said I wanted to explore what the laws of physics say about the limits of sustainable energy, assuming money is no object. On those grounds, I should certainly go ahead, industrialize the countryside, and push the PV farm onto the stack. At the same time, I want to help people figure out what we should be doing between now and 2050. And today, electricity from solar farms would be four times as expensive as the market rate. So I feel a bit irresponsible as I include this estimate in the sustainable production stack in figure 6.9 – paving 5% of the UK with solar panels seems beyond the bounds of plausibility in so many ways.

A second observation (or criticism) is that MacKay seems to have also been too pessimistic in term of not just his cost assumption but also efficiency. In the above calculation, MacKay used 10% efficiency panels:

I assumed only 10%-efficient panels, by the way, because I imagine that solar panels would be mass-produced on such a scale only if they were very cheap, and it’s the lower-efficiency panels that will get cheap first.

In reality, those crystalline-silicon PV modules shown in the BNEF report above are far more efficient. From the United States Department of Energy:

Crystalline silicon PV cells are the most common solar cells used in commercially available solar panels…..

……Crystalline silicon PV cells have laboratory energy conversion efficiencies over 25% for single-crystal cells and over 20% for multicrystalline cells. However, industrially produced solar modules currently achieve efficiencies ranging from 18%–22% under standard test conditions.

 

True, these efficiencies are at the panel level not at the solar farm level. A utility scale solar facility will also need room for inverters, control panels, transmissions mechanisms, maintenance huts, security facilities and so on. Yet, we are already at around 20% efficiency levels for commercial products in 2019. Even if we knock off a few percentage points of efficiency to take account of ground cover occupied by stuff needed for a solar installation other than the panels, we are still far above MacKay’s efficiency figure.

A second area where MacKay was far too pessimistic with respect to the technology relates to the Shockley-Queisser limit. This limit sets the maximum theoretical upper efficiency limit of a single layer solar cell to around 33%. However, a new generation of multijunction cells has hopped over the Shockley-Queisser limit. With a two-layer cell your theoretical ceiling is 44% and with three layers 50%. The US National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) shows the major improvements achieved in the past and those predicted for the future. The energy academic Varun Sivaram also devotes a chapter in his book “Taming the Sun” to these frontier PV technologies.

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Currently, the really super-high efficiency panels that are up at 40% are not cost competitive enough to adopt for commercial use. Further, most have drawbacks in terms of manufacturing cells at sufficient size and also with respect to building cells durable enough to be deployed in real-world field conditions. Yet results to date suggest the more efficient panels have kept migrating out of the laboratory and into the marketplace at an ever-falling price.

Given where we are now in terms of panel efficiency and where we will likely be in 10 years time, it is possible that the 200 m2 of land allocated by MacKay to every UK citizen for solar panels could actually meet all the UK energy needs; that is, 125 kWh per person per day if we were deploying 25% efficiency panels (provided that the energy could be transferred though time and space). Further, once solar PV technology can be incorporated into roof tiles and road pavings, not all of the required space need be taken from agriculture land (figure below taken from Without the Hot Air“).

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Then, of course, we could add energy generated from wind into our mix. Each additional kWh coming from wind energy means one less kWh needs to come from solar energy. Tony Seba’s focus was on solar, but I see solar and wind as inseparable twins.

Overall, Mackay was far too pessimistic over the ability of solar to come down its cost curve. In my next post, however, I want to look at an even more potent argument against the future primacy of solar. The blogger Euan Mearns and his co-contributor Roger Andrews are not huge fans of renewables and feel the displacement of solar is a pipe dream of green fantasists. We shall see what they have to say.

 

Testing Tony Seba’s EV Predictions 19 (How Low Could Battery Prices Go?)

As discussed in my last post, the price of an electric vehicle (EV) battery will play a central role in determining EV sales versus internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle sales through to Tony Seba’s forecast horizon of 2030.

In that post, I also noted that the average sales price of a vehicle in the USA was $36,113 in 2017. Further, I roughly estimated that the cost of an ICE powertrain plus fuel tank was in the order of $3,400 in that year, or roughly 9.5% of the retail sticker price for an average car. Finally, I made the heroic assumption that an EV powertrain without the battery would cost about $1,000. Accordingly, if the powertrain plus battery of an EV is to come down to the cost of an ICE powertrain plus fuel tank, then the battery most come down to $2,400. Is that possible?

To have an EV completely without range anxiety, and given current miles per kilowatt hour (kWh) of battery efficiency, I speculated in another post that a 100 kWh battery would be required. Based on these assumptions, we can back out the target price of the battery (measured per kWh) in order for EVs to match ICE vehicles in price; in other words, $2,400 divided by 100 kWh, or $24 per kWh.

As mentioned in my last post, Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) estimated that the weighted average cost of an EV battery in 2017 was $209 per kWh. BNEF analysts estimate that this number will come down to $100 by 2023 and Tesla believes that it can hit the $100 number in 2020. But how much lower that $100 per kWh can a battery pack go? Is $24 a possible 12-year target?

Before we get too despondent over hitting the $24 figure, it should be noted that the industry has, in general, been far too pessimist about the speed of cost reductions with respect to battery-pack pricing. The chart below was taken from a September 2017 article titled “Cost Projection of State of the Art Lithium-Ion Batteries for Electric Vehicles Up to 2030” by Berckmans et al in the academic journal Energies. As of 2018, Tesla is already well below $200 per kWh. So those past predictions have turned out far too pessimist.

Sales Price Prediction Lithium-Ion

Nonetheless, while Tesla/Panasonic, the market leaders in battery technology are still securing both technology-driven cost savings and economies-of-scale related cost savings, there are limits as to how far they can go in battery cost reductions.

The most important limiting factor is raw material costs. The table below gives a breakdown of the cathode component alone in a battery pack as provided by Total Battery Consulting’s Dr. Menahem Anderman in a Seeking Alpha article. So the cathode materials alone come to $46 per kWh before we add in the anode, electrolyte, separator and then all the battery management software and hardware required to stop the battery overheating and to maintain the battery’s life.

Cathode Cost

True, the most costly material used in a Tesla battery is cobalt, and the use of cobalt has been on a declining trend.

Cobalt Usage

Moreover, Elon Musk made this statement in the company’s 2018 Q1 conference call (a Reuters article on this theme can be found here).

“we think we can get the cobalt to almost nothing”

Yet even if we near eliminate cobalt, the lithium and nickel alone will prevent the battery pack price getting anywhere close to $25 per kWh.

More realistically, it may be possible to achieve a $50 per kWh battery sometime after 2025. For a 100 kWh vehicle, $50 per kWh gives a total battery pack cost of $5,000, yet we are trying to seek parity with ICE vehicle pricing by producing a battery pack for around $2,500. What is to be done?

There are two possible solutions. First, a leap in battery chemistry could be achieved such that both energy density (kWh per litre) and specific energy (kWh per kg) jump higher without the need for more raw materials. Solid-state batteries appear the lead contender to become the next generation commercial battery technology some time in the mid-2020s. Apart, from eliminating cobalt, solid-state batteries would boost both energy density and specific energy and, once the technology beds down, these batteries have the potential to push battery costs much lower.

Tony Seba, however, is not looking for a technology breakthrough. A major component of Seba’s EV thesis relates to technology cost curves, and his presentations frequently feature the slide below (for example here). The curve is exponential and shows a 16% decline in costs per annum. Moreover, the technology cost curve is really an amalgam of cost-cutting achieved through economies of scale and through ‘learning by doing’. In short, these are incremental cost savings, not revolutionary cost savings.

Projected Battery Cost

For existing lithium ion technology, there are theoretical reasons why both energy density and specific energy cannot go above certain levels that we are fast approaching. Further, while we may be able to eliminate certain battery materials we cannot eliminate all the expensive battery materials. The only way we can stay on this 16% per annum downward-sloping exponential curve is for us to jump into a new generation of battery technology. This may, or may not, happen within Tony’s 2030 forecast horizon, but it is certainly not a given.

OK, let’s assume that we don’t get solid state out of the lab and into the factory in the forecast time horizon and we can’t get battery pack costs down to $25 per kWh. The Tony Seba thesis is that EVs will rule the world by 2030. Should we laugh at that goal? Not quite. It is possible that if we loosen our battery size condition at which range anxiety is eliminated, we may still get there. And one way this could be done is through introducing dynamic charging, or charging in motion.

Currently, the 75 kWh battery in a Model 3 can keep the car on the road for 310 miles. Accordingly, a 50 kWh battery will keep it on the road for around 200 miles. But to eliminate range anxiety,  I posited in a previous post that we needed a car to go 450 miles on one charge. One way we can square this particular circle is to charge a car while it is moving, and Qualcomm is developing a dynamic vehicle electric charging (DEVC) system called Halo that does just that.

The Halo system can charge your car at a maximum rate of 22 kilowatts. Therefore, if you travelled over this system for one hour continuously you theoretically could charge your car by 22 kWh. Do that a number of times over a long distance journey, say for 3 hours in total, and that would add 66 kWhs. So now our 50 kWh EV can more than double its range to above 400 miles and bye bye range anxiety. Of course, assuming your EV driver is doing 60 miles per hour, three hours of driving translates into roughly 180 miles, or 290 kilometres. That is considerably longer than the Qualcomm 100 metre DEVC test track. And, of course, we haven’t considered the cost of the required infrastructure.

The other alternative is to bring your car to a stop, but have access to a mega super charger such that an extra 100 miles could be added in minutes. If our 50 kWh Tesla Model 3 can do around 200 miles on one charge, then to add 100 miles you would need a charger to add 25 kWh. A new charger by ABB boasts a charge rate of 350 kW. At that rate, 100 miles could be added in about 5 minutes. Such mega fast charging rates provide further challenges for battery technology, since they have the potential to severely damage a battery if not managed properly. Indeed, no existing EVs on the road could currently cope with such charge rates. Nonetheless, the next generation of high-end German EVs appear to be designed to take advantage of a new generation of super chargers, with Porsche first to market with its Mission E vehicle to be launched in late 2019. Given time, this technology is likely to trickle down to mid- and low-end EV models.

In conclusion, getting the price of a battery down to a point where EVs can blow away ICE vehicles on price is not a given. Indeed, it is very difficult to see how incremental improvements in current battery technology alone can vanquish the internal combustion engine. Nonetheless, it is just possible that the combination of a slightly smaller battery coupled with new charging technology could do the job. At that point, EVs should match or exceed ICE vehicles in every area of the car purchase decision, so setting up the possibility that the market will tip and EV domination was arrive at an unprecedented pace.

Finally, the word ‘unpredicted’ could perhaps substitute for the word ‘unprecedented’ since no mainstream organisation or company is forecasting EV sales to vanquish ICE vehicle sales by 2030. The differing EV sales scenarios will be the subject of my last post in this series.

For those of you coming to this series of posts midway, here is a link to the beginning of the series.